Abstract

Communities in New England are using a collaboration strategy as one means of tackling the socio-economic, environmental and cultural changes they face today. The paper reports on two case studies of collaboration on a fishing industry health care plan in Massachusetts and a working waterfront preservation effort in Maine. These New England coastal communities experienced many of the same challenges, and achieve many of the same benefits, as collaboration in other natural resource contexts. Partnerships with stakeholders outside of the customary network (i.e., reaching out to uncommon partners) were central in the case studies. The networks among participants in the cases were compact with no individual more than two to three individuals removed from the resources (e.g., information, skills, financial) they needed to achieve the projects’ objectives. Ramifications for community leaders and public officials are discussed.

Keywords: collaboration, coastal communities, networks

Introduction

Coastal fishing communities in New England, like many natural resource-dependent communities, are undergoing significant changes—ecological, economic, social, and cultural transitions—in part as a response to natural resource degradation (i.e., declining fish stocks) and subsequent management response (i.e., regulatory restrictions on fishing). While some fish species in the Gulf of Maine and on Georges Bank have increased in biomass, stocks of particular concern (e.g., Gulf of Maine cod, Gulf of Maine and southern New England yellowtail and winter flounder, and white hake) continue to experience higher mortality than desired and may not be rebuilding sufficiently (New England Fisheries Management Council 2006). In response to the stock status of these species of concern, regulatory restrictions that seek to reduce fish mortality have increased substantially; in New England, those regulatory actions have included daily catch limits, net mesh size increases, reductions in the number of days of fishing allowed, and closure of essential fish habitat and spawning grounds (Hartley and Robertson 2006). For example, it was estimated that the typical fishers experienced a 75% reduction in his/her permitted fishing days at sea from 160 days to 40 days between 1994 and 2006 (Fraser 2006).

These regulatory restrictions have had adverse impacts on the industry, coastal and fishing communities, and the public policy context in New England. Fraser (2006) reported a 32% decline in the number of vessels with active groundfish permits between 2003 and 2004. Hall-Arber et al. (2001) documented impacts on New England’s fishing industry and communities in the late 1990s/early 2000s, including impeded economic and social resilience and flexibility, increased tensions between industry sectors and gear types, and amplified sense of hopelessness. Furthermore, the professional, working relationships between fishers, scientists and fisheries managers have also been damaged in New England. Hartley and Robertson (2006) found distrust among scientists, managers and fishers, an adversarial policy climate and disputed science, and political appeals and responses to the socio-economic hardships caused by regulations.

Ecological, socio-economic, and political/cultural changes are not unusual in rural and natural resource-dependent communities, and there is a blossoming literature on social capital and the resilience or ability of communities to cope with change (e.g., see Rolfe 2006). While naturally there are many community responses to these changes, including educational programs, regional governance initiatives, community health and wellness programs, and social and economic development initiatives (see e.g., the Resilient Communities Project2 and the Coastal Communities Project3 at the University of British Columbia), collaboration at vari-
ous scales and with a variety of objectives has been an emerging phenomenon in New England. For example, new collaborative initiatives have emerged in New England fisheries management in the cod, herring, summer flounder, scallops, tilefish, and other groundfish species fisheries (Pinto da Silva and Kitts 2006; Kitts et al. 2007). Collaborative research initiatives among fishers, scientists and managers have expanded in response to the fisheries challenges (Hartley and Robertson 2006). Collaboration has not been the only response to the socioeconomic pressures experienced in coastal communities and those pressures comprise only one of the factors driving these collaborations. Nonetheless, collaboration in this context is an important social phenomenon worthy of closer examination.

Two case studies were conducted to assess the characteristics of both broader programmatic and project-specific collaboration in Gulf of Maine coastal communities. Collaboration is a voluntary multi-party arrangement, involving face-to-face interactions and interdependence, working toward concrete goals and crossing institutional, interest, perception and geographic boundaries (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). After a discussion of the collaboration literature, research methods, and details from the two case studies, Fishing Partnership Health Plan initiative and York Working Waterfront: Sewall’s Bridge Dock project, this paper includes analysis and findings from the cases. We conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of these findings for communities and government officials, although the extent to which these two case studies may be generalized is limited and results should not be extrapolated beyond northern New England.

**Theory and Practice of Collaboration**

There are many definitions of collaboration in the literature (Gray 1989; Ostrom 1990; Axelrod 1997), although O’Leary, et al. (2006, 7) provide a practical, operational definition applicable to the context of this research: collaboration is the “process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to cooperate to achieve common goals, working across boundaries in multi-sector relationships.”

A theoretical foundation for collaboration in the American context has emerged from public policy and political science. Collaboration can be thought of, from a classic liberalism political tradition, as a process of self-interest bargaining that combines individual interests and preferences into a collective choice. Alternatively from a civic republicanism perspective, collaboration is an integrative process of deliberation that builds mutual understanding, a unified will, trust and sympathy among people, and thus leads to action on shared preferences (Perry and Thomson 2004).

Based upon these competing views on collaboration, the research and literature has emphasized pre-requisites for collaboration, that is, collaborative process design features, and outcomes of collaborative processes (Bingham and O’Leary 2006). For example, Gray’s (1989) seminal work on collaboration presented a three-phase framework of problem setting, direction setting, and implementation. Further, Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) contains an analytical framework used to analyze the case studies in this research:

- **Context**: incentives to collaborate; what is at stake for parties?
- **Getting Started**: what is the spark that triggers collaboration?
- **Process**: what are the features of the collaborative process?
- **Benefits**: what outcomes have been achieved?
- **Challenges**: what obstacles have been encountered and how have they been addressed?

However, what has received less attention is what happens inside the interactive process of collaboration, in the iterative deliberations and negotiation process (Bingham and O’Leary 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006). Examining inter-organizational arrangements, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) proposed an iterative and cyclical process of re-negotiation in collaboration that established personal relationships, psychological contracts, and mutual understanding and norms that transcend assigned organizational roles and formal legal contracts.

Consequently, in addition to analyzing the cases of collaboration with the Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) framework above, this research embedded simple network analysis principles into the case study protocols to test whether network mapping would further our understanding of the internal deliberations within collaboration.

**Methods**

A project advisory committee was established, composed of representatives from fishing industry organizations, community development corporations in the coastal region, academic leaders in coastal communities, members of social science advisory committees to fisheries management agencies, and Sea Grant staff. The advisory committee served as a reviewer of research designs and protocols, as well as a link to end users for the transfer of research findings and conclusions. Below is a brief overview of each research approach. Widely accepted confidentiality and consent procedures and
Case Studies

Two case studies—Fishing Partnership Health Plan (FPHP) and Sewall’s Bridge Dock working waterfront project in York, Maine—were conducted between 2005 and 2006. The research design employs accepted case study protocols (Yin 1994) and a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data sources were collected and analyzed, including case documentation and secondary data, direct observation (e.g., public meetings), and key informant and participant interviews. Quantitative and qualitative data from several sources permit a triangulation process in interpreting results. Data sources included U.S. Census Data, additional web-based data collection instruments, interviews of participants and other community members, case documentation, meetings, and other diverse sources of quantitative or qualitative data.

Case documentation data were collected through web-searches and other general case files and document repositories, and provided by individual participants. The Sewall’s Bridge Dock case was well covered by the local newspapers and included one consultant-conducted case summary. The FPHP case did not receive as much media attention, although empirical studies of the insurance needs and the insurance plan were conducted by outside experts. Participants provided documentation on both cases. Considerable documentation from Sewall’s Bridge Dock was posted on stakeholder websites.

The research team traveled within New England to conduct face-to-face interviews with key participants and conducted phone-interviews. A total of five in-person and phone interviews were conducted with key Fishing Partnership Health Plan leaders representing each stakeholder group, and six in-person and phone interviews were conducted with Sewall’s Bridge Dock participants. The text data from case documentation and interview transcripts underwent standard content analysis and quality control protocols that identified themes and patterns in segments of text comments (e.g., we employed a multiple-coder strategy among members of the research team thus validating coding methods) (Lofland and Lofland 1995; Miles and Huberman 1994).

The case study employed a collaborative process analytical framework to assess the context, initiation, process and implementation, benefits and challenges of the examples (see Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Within the case study, a preliminary network analysis strategy was employed to examine features of individuals and the internal deliberations underlying collaboration. Network analysis is a formal method of collecting, analyzing and graphically representing data on a map that characterizes the relationships and interactions (i.e., linkages) within and between groups of people or organizations (i.e., actors), and how those people interact with specific resources (e.g., information, human or financial resources). By mapping these relationships, interactions, and flow of resources (e.g., information, funds, influence, etc.) network analysis helps uncover formal and informal communication pathways and patterns. Specific measures and analytical methods have been developed to characterize the individual actors, linkages, and the overall network (see Monge and Contractor 2003; Scott 2000; Haythornthwaite 1996). However, in the FPHP and York: Sewall’s Bridge Dock cases a full network analysis was not conducted; rather interview protocols included questions to solicit the characteristics of the linkages among individuals in a qualitative manner.

Fishing Partnership Health Plan, Massachusetts

The Fishing Partnership Health Plan (FPHP) is an affordable, comprehensive health insurance plan for individuals and their families employed in the fishing industry. It is managed by a Board of Directors that includes fishing industry leaders and is administered by the Massachusetts Fisher men’s Partnership (MFP), an umbrella organization representing all sectors of commercial fishers and their associations, and the Tufts Health Plan. Consequently, it is predominantly a Massachusetts-based health plan, although it sought broader regional participation during its initial design and implementation.

The FPHP reduced the uninsured rate among Massachusetts’ fishers from 43% in 1996 to 13% in 2006 (covering over 2,000 individuals). Further, the FPHP was developed in parallel with a state-wide, umbrella organization for the state’s fishing industry, the MFP. In fact, MFP leadership selected health care as a cornerstone issue because it was a unifying concern among the diverse and competing segments of the industry. In 2006, the FPHP and the process of using health care as a mobilizing force in the fishing industry is the model for a current national fishing industry health plan initiative undertaken by the Commercial Fishermen of America (CFA). See Table 1 for a timeline of key events for the FPHP case.

Getting Started

As one of New England’s major fishing ports, Gloucester directly suffered substantial socioeconomic impacts from declining stocks and regulatory change. By the summer of 1994, the “fishing community was being affected by regula-
tions we did not understand and we were afraid for the future,” according to one industry leader who was also a leader of the St. Ann’s Church, Gloucester’s church of the fishers. In that capacity, he thought of involving Cardinal Bernard Law of the Boston Archdiocese, who was a regular attendee at the annual June fishermen’s festival in Gloucester; “I saw the Cardinal as a person that the fishermen would look to as a leader that they would trust because a lot of them are Catholic and the ones that weren’t Catholic would still trust him.” St. Ann’s Church approached the Boston Archdiocese, secured the Cardinal’s willingness to help, and hosted a public meeting in August 1994. Cardinal Law met for over two hours with fishers and their families in a packed St. Ann’s Church, listened to their stories, and committed to helping in any way he could.

An outcome of the meeting was that Gloucester should undertake strategic planning. The strategic planning process was initiated in the late summer/early fall of 1994 among a group of industry leaders who held a series of fishers’ roundtable meetings in Gloucester. A facilitator was hired and a typical strategic planning exercise was initiated (e.g., identification of strengths, weaknesses, assets and threats).

The Archdiocese of Boston remained engaged throughout the process and as a newspaper recount put it, “Cardinal Bernard Law has quietly played the role of peacemaker among rival groups of fishermen in an effort to get members of the embattled industry cooperating” (Krasner 1995, 1). Cardinal Law noted, “At a later meeting at my house, my role was just to urge the different groups to work together—to see that their fate was really intertwined” (Krasner 1995, 1). Other participants agreed that Cardinal Law’s leadership played a significant role; a state Senator from Gloucester said, “I think the cardinal has been successful in getting people to begin the dialogue” (Krasner 1995, 1).

By the spring of 1995, the strategic planning was completed and three primary goals emerged, seeking greater engagement in fisheries management, paying attention to the health of the ecosystem, and making an effort in community development. In addition, two specific needs were identified: 1) an umbrella organization for all Massachusetts’ fishers and 2) health care for the fishing industry. The umbrella organization started as the informal fishermen’s roundtable groups and lead to the creation of the Massachusetts Fishermen’s Partnership (MFP).

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<td>Event</td>
<td>Severe regulatory restrictions—two emergency orders and Amendment 5 to Multi-species Groundfish Fisheries Management Plan.</td>
<td>August—Cardinal Law meets with fishermen and families in St. Ann’s Church in Gloucester.</td>
<td>Fishermen’s roundtable initiates Strategic Planning.</td>
<td>May—Strategic plan completed: need for health care and an umbrella organization representing fishing industry.</td>
<td>January—MFP incorporated</td>
<td>Federal government commits $2M.</td>
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<td>State government commits $10M over five years.</td>
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<td>FPHP incorporated.</td>
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<td>Working group dissolves and Board of Directors created.</td>
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<td>First enrollment opens.</td>
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<td>Federal government commits $1M.</td>
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Table 1. Fishermen’s Partnerships Health Plan: Timeline of Key Events

Hartley, Gagne and Robertson
Health care was a need that crossed industry sectors (e.g., lobsterers, groundfishers, dredgers, etc.) and vertically within the industry from crew through to the captains and their families. As one fishing industry leader put it, “Our question was, what do we all have in common—our common need, common desire and a common link? And it came down to good affordable health care. We have a lot of differences, but we have this one demanding need and that’s health care.”

The participants of the fishermen’s roundtable then took the health care need back to Cardinal Law and the Boston Archdiocese.

The archbishop had made a commitment to help in any way they could. They have a network of hospitals. They are in the health care business. Why not ask them to help us on that project? We took it to the cardinal. The cardinal took it to the president of Caritas Christi [the Catholic health care system] and got their board to agree. And Caritas Christi made a major commitment to work with us to make that happen. Then we started to build a coalition—Fishing industry leader.

The fishers leaders worked with John Moynihan of the Boston Archdiocese Planning Office of Urban Affairs and with Caritas Christi leadership to form a working group that could begin to build a health care plan for the fishing industry. The working group included experienced health care professionals, such as the Vice President of Public Affairs with Caritas Christi; three fishing industry leaders from Gloucester and New Bedford, Massachusetts; a senior health care consultant; the President for Health Care for All, a health insurance advocacy organization; a senior government relations consultant/lobbyist; and Director of Brighton Marine Hospital in the Boston Archdiocese network.

The working group mobilized considerable financial resources and expertise; “really senior people with in-depth experience,” noted a fishing industry leader. A health care administrator added, “when you are starting a new organization, try to find the expertise and the ability to put together a think tank for you.”

Partners

Caritas Christi invested considerable funds into the planning, design and initiation of the health plan. They paid the consultants for their participation on the working group and funded the survey of the fishing industry to quantify the scope of the insurance need. The Director of Brighton Marine Hospital provided technical expertise and represented the hospitals in the Boston Archdiocese network. The senior health care consultant was an expert in insurance products, design, and financing and was charged with building a network that could work for the fishing industry.

The Health Care for All staff and MFP jointly administered a Caritas Christi-funded survey of the fishing industry in the summer of 1996. The survey aimed to demonstrate that health care for fishers was an important issue that needed state and federal support and secondly, to collect cost data to inform the financial design of the health plan. The survey of 485 fishers represented 1,479 adults and children potentially eligible for participation in the health plan. MFP and industry leaders aided in the development, pilot testing, dissemination and outreach for the survey. The results showed that 43% of adults and 34% of children were uninsured—that was triple the average in Massachusetts. Another 9% had been uninsured during the past year (Socholitzky and Turnbull 1999).

With the lobbyist’s leadership, the working group engaged the Massachusetts Congressional delegation, particularly Senator Edward Kennedy, followed by Congressman Barney Frank and the rest of the Massachusetts delegation and state Senator Mark Montigny. Given the magnitude of the uninsured and under-insured in the fishing industry, Congress was persuaded in October 1997 to set aside $2 million from a $25 million federal boat buy-back program to initiate the Fishing Partnership Health Plan (FPHP). Since the buy-back program would benefit boat owners and not crew members or their families, working group members argued it was justified to use $2 million from the buy-back funds to assist others in the fishing industry that were harmed by new regulatory restrictions.

Congress further appropriated funds to subsidize the premium costs. Through the U.S. Department of Commerce, grants were made of $1.95 million in fiscal year (FY) 1998 and $1 million in FY1999. One fishing industry leader noted that, “Federal money makes the wheels turn in the states and in the private sector. Gets everyone to the table.” In 1996, the fishers and the working group members engaged their state elected officials, particularly state Senator Montigny from New Bedford, and by 1997 secured $10 million of matching funds over five years, FY1997–FY2002 (Stewardson 1997). Senator Montigny chaired the state health care committee and was “instrumental in getting the initial state funding,” according to a health care administrator. Two additional state matching fund appropriations have been secured through 2012, totaling nearly $30 million. These funds further subsidized the premium costs for the plan.

Organizational Capacity

By March 1996, the working group hired a manager, initially as an intern as he completed his masters in health care administration from Boston University. He served a critical role in organizing the working group, keeping tasks moving,
and ultimately evolved into a senior management role with the FPHP once it was incorporated in the fall of 1997. He recalled, “I was getting an MBA with a concentration in health care management when I heard about this idea ... I thought it was a fantastic idea because if you can cover fishermen, you can cover anyone.”

The working group dissolved after incorporation of the FPHP and a Board of Directors was selected. The Board included two fishers, representatives from MFP, Caritas Christi, and Brighton Marine Hospital. Procedurally, MFP names three members of the Board of Directors and then the Board selects the remaining six members. As the FPHP built capacity, Caritas Christi gradually devolved itself. MFP’s role is to provide enrollment and outreach services and serve as “the human resource department in a corporation for the industry.” MFP coordinates the sales program that enrolls fishing industry members and families into the plan.

One of the first tasks for the Board and FPHP’s Executive Director was to draft a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the provider of the health insurance network and administration. With Caritas Christi’s guidance, the RFP described the population to be served and the benefits package. There were a couple of bidders and Tufts Health Plan was selected. The Tufts Health Plan is composed of more than 17,000 health care providers and 81 hospitals throughout New England.

**Outcome—Health Plan**

FPHP is a stand-alone health plan serving members of the fishing industry, including crew, captains, and their families. To be eligible, individuals must earn at least 50% of their income from fishing or from work in a fishing-related industry, such as fish processing or fishing gear production. Subsidized premiums are provided on a sliding scale based on income and family size. FPHP uses the Tufts Health Plan network of physicians and hospitals to provide comprehensive coverage and small co-payments with no co-insurance. There are no restrictions or exclusions for pre-existing conditions. Benefits cover preventative services (e.g., discounted eyewear and fitness club membership); chiropractic services; outpatient medical care; inpatient hospital care; maternity care; emergency care; home health and mental care; substance abuse services; skilled nursing care; prescription drugs; and ambulance services.

After the first round of enrollment in 1997, 459 fishers and their families signed up, totaling 926 individuals. Of these, 53% qualified for the largest premium subsidy, 23% the average subsidy, 12% the least, and 12% received no subsidy for the premiums (Laidler 1998). Since 1997, the rate of uninsured Massachusetts fishers has been reduced from 43% to 13% (Bergeron and Randall 2006), with total individual enrollments (i.e., fishers and their family members) increasing to 1,300 after the 1999 open enrollment period, 1,653 after 2003, and over 2,000 after 2006 (DeFrancesco 2003; Laidler 1998).

**Sewall’s Bridge Dock Working Waterfront Project, Maine**

The Sewall’s Bridge Dock project in York, Maine was a project-specific collaboration between two lobster fishers, the York Land Trust and several supporting parties. Together they purchased a 2,390 square foot dock and about 1/6 acres of adjacent land, negotiated a conservation easement to protect a scenic viewed and water quality, and preserved a working waterfront in York, Maine. The lobsterers own and operate the Sewall’s Bridge dock and property, while the York Land Trust holds the conservation easement.

The partnership emerged from an 11-month fund-raising and property sale and easement negotiation process. The Sewall’s Bridge Dock, which serves 14 fishers who land approximately 250,000 pounds of lobster annually, preserved an aesthetic viewshed, and prevented the conversion of working waterfront property to private residential property. Further, the York initiative developed in parallel and in support of broader regional conservation programs and a state-wide working waterfront initiative. Sewall’s Bridge dock project has been advanced as a state and national model for conservation—fishing partnerships and a template for novel working waterfront easements. Table 2 summarizes the key milestones in the York working waterfront case.

**Getting Started**

The decreased economic viability of fishing, resulting in part from the increased regulatory restrictions, made the fishing industry and its shore-side infrastructure more vulnerable to alternative economic development. For example, homes have replaced many buildings and piers along Maine’s 5,300 mile coastline and only 25 miles of the coastline remained working waterfront (CEI 2002). In the 2002 study, Coastal Enterprises, Inc. (CEI) found the entire 25 miles of remaining working waterfront to be vulnerable—40% of the commercial fishing access was provided by private residence and 35% by private commercial operations. The small portion of remaining shorefront suited to water-dependent uses has become harder for long-time landowners to retain, given development pressures and rising shorefront real estate values and property taxes (Colgan 2004). There is a growing coastal population in Maine, increasing property taxes, and until a recent slow-down in 2006, a real estate boom (CEI 2002). This trend, coupled with declines in traditional industries and infrastructure, has made it hard for many marine businesses to survive (Maine Coastal Program 2006).
York, located in southern Maine, less than 100 miles from Boston, has endured significant development pressures through the mid-2000s. Since the 1980s, three waterfront docks were purchased and access prohibited—one was sold for more than $1 million, converted to a residence and resold for $2.3 million (Goad 2003). York County has been the fastest growing county in Maine, with a 13% increase in population between 1990 and 2000 and projected 6% growth between 2000 and 2003 (Quimby 2004). In 2003, York County experienced a 9.2% increase in building permits for new housing (1,723) and between 1997 and 2002, York County lost 12,207 acres, or 18%, of its farmland to predominantly residential development (Quimby 2004).

Even the economic prowess of the lobster industry, which has had record landings in Maine throughout the early 2000s (Trotter 2006), has not necessarily kept pace with the escalating cost of coastal property. As one York lobsterer said, “People are willing to spend unbelievable amounts of money to buy these places, and we can’t compete with it” (Goad 2003). Three docks on the harbor had been lost since the 1980s (Goad 2003) and only two piers remained available for commercial fishing operations. Sewall’s Bridge Dock was the only dock with truck access left in York and, while it had been used by commercial fishers for decades, it was privately owned and rented to fishers (Goad 2003; MacGillis 2006). It was sold in 2000 and the owner secured building permits for a new home on the property, rebuilt the existing dock, and razed an existing residence (MacGillis 2006). The house, however, was not built and the property was listed for sale again in the summer of 2002.

Sympathetic to the fishers’ diminishing waterfront access and in response to a request for help from one of the York lobsterers, the York Harbor Board member tapped on his network of contacts to assemble a group of prospective partners to purchase the Sewall’s Bridge Dock. “I sent an e-mail to . . . , the director of the Wells Estuarine Reserve, asking for his thoughts on how we could do this. He forwarded it to [a Coastal Enterprises, Inc. (CEI) representative] and to [a Maine Coastal Program official]. We started moving from there . . .” (Dandurant 2003). A preliminary meeting was held at the York Historical Society offices in late January 2003 to explore strategies for acquiring the property and preserving working waterfront and to identify potential partners and contributors.

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<td>Waterfront access on three piers lost since 1980s.</td>
<td>New owner obtains building permits for home.</td>
<td>Summer—Sewall’s Bridge dock and property for sale again. Asking $800,000.</td>
<td>Late January—First meeting among prospective parties to explore strategies for acquiring the property and preserving working waterfront and to identify potential partners and contributors.</td>
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<td>Sewall’s Bridge dock and adjacent property for sale. Fishermen make unsuccessful bid to purchase.</td>
<td>Existing house on adjacent property razed and dock re-built.</td>
<td>August 2002—York Land Trust use fishermen’s fishing vessel for trip to tour farmland conservation project on York River. Fishermen challenge land trust to help fishermen.</td>
<td>February—Meeting with York Land Trust Board of Directors to discuss possible purchase of easement on Sewall’s Bridge Dock. Board of Directors divided on whether to participate.</td>
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<td>August/September—Fishermen approach York Harbor Board member to explore options for purchasing Sewall’s Bridge dock and property.</td>
<td>April—York Land Trust agree to supply expertise, donor support, and explore the purchase of an easement.</td>
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<td>Fall—York Harbor Board member contacts prospective partners, gathers information, begins to convene a multi-party partnership.</td>
<td>Spring/summer—Offer made and accepted by seller.</td>
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<td>Summer—Parties fund-raising and assemble financing.</td>
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<td>November 30—York Land Trust Board voted to accept easement language on the “Sewall’s Bridge Dock Conservation” project, agreeing to purchase an easement for $410,000.</td>
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<td>December 1—Closing on property.</td>
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<td>Dock serves 14 local fishermen. ~250,000 lbs. of lobster landed annually.</td>
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Table 2. Sewall’s Bridge Dock Project: Timeline of Key Events

Dock serves 14 local fishermen. ~250,000 lbs. of lobster landed annually.
The lobsterers informed the other attendees at the January 2003 meeting that they could afford $300,000 toward the purchase of the property, considerably less than the $800,000 asking price. Two potential contributors were identified, the York Historical Society and the York Land Trust. The Vice President of the York Land Trust Board was the wife of the Harbor Board member and she served on the Board of the York Rivers association. The York Historical Society representative was unwilling to participate because, according to the Harbor Board member convener, “the historical society was beginning a capital campaign that didn’t include waterfront properties.”

In early 2003, the York Land Trust was a reluctant partner on the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project, with a divided Board of Directors. The land trust’s mission is to conserve and protect “lands of ecological, historic, scenic, agricultural and educational significance in the greater York, Maine area,” through a range of strategies, including collaborations “with state agencies, town government, and other conservation organizations to protect critical ecosystems and habitat for wildlife” (York Land Trust 2006).

The CEI participants articulated their role in the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project as:

- Brainstorming strategies for financing;
- Providing legal advice to fishermen and encouraging fishermen to retain their own counsel;
- Assisting with fundraising, including pre-development costs;
- Financing land trust purchase of development rights; and
- Supplying legal expertise for the drafting of the easement.

CEI is a private, non-profit community development corporation and community development financial institution whose mission is “to help create economically and environmentally healthy communities in which all people, especially those with low incomes, can reach their full potential” (CEI 2006).

The Partnership

The Harbor Board member convened the multi-party partnership. The Harbor Board member recalled the initial discussions with the York Land Trust Board as “very difficult” with “some Board members excited and some cautious.” Skeptics were concerned that the project was “not conservation [and] too expensive,” and it was unclear how the project fit in to the land trust’s objectives (MacGillis 2006, 5).

In February 2003, the Mount Agamenticus to the Sea Conservation (MtA2C) Initiative was just underway and was raising funds to hire staff for a broader $10 million capital campaign. MtA2C is a coalition of ten national, regional and local partners aiming to conserve critical lands, waterways and working landscapes over a six-town area in southwestern Maine. The York Land Trust was participating in the MtA2C initiative, but property acquisition priorities were not yet established. Thus, some York Land Trust board members were initially concerned that the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project would divert funding, organizational capacity and focus away from the MtA2C initiative.

However, other board members saw it differently. The York Harbor Board member discussed the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project with The Nature Conservancy (TNC) representative on the MtA2C Initiative and convinced him to support the project. TNC representative noted, “I know a great story when I see one, and this is a great story. [I supported the project] as part of, or at least connected to the MtA2C effort” (MacGillis 2006, 5). Further, the Harbor Board member secured support from three key York Land Trust board members, including one who was new to the land trust board, an important catalyst for the MtA2C Initiative, and well connected to the Maine philanthropic community (MacGillis 2006). Support for the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project from key individuals on the York Land Trust and Mt2AC boards of directors proved sufficiently persuasive to engender support from the York Land Trust. By the spring of 2003, the York Land Trust was discussing how to offer an easement, expertise and donor support to the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project.

Through the Working Waterfront Loan Fund, CEI offered up the $300,000 to the York Land Trust to purchase the easement. CEI was familiar and experienced with a wide range of coastal resources and utilized those connections to secure a grant from the Island Foundation to cover interest and administrative costs associated with the loan to the York Land Trust.

Throughout the formation and implementation of the project-specific collaboration, there was an effort to clearly link and articulate the connection between land conservation needs and interests and the working waterfront needs and interests in York. The York Land Trust committed to the project in part because it felt that the dock was part of the historic and scenic beauty of the York River, and as part of the viewshed, it fell within the land trust’s mission to protect the Sewall’s Bridge dock and property from unwanted development (Snyder 2004). The easement’s opening statement of purpose read:
It is the purpose of this grant to preserve the Protected Property for scenic and open space values; to limit its private use to “Working Waterfront Uses;” and to assure the opportunity of the general public to access the York River via the Right of Way without charge or fee in order to enjoy recreational use and views of the York River consistent with Grantor’s [the fishermen’s] permitted uses, and to prevent residential uses and those commercial and industrial uses not included within the definition . . . of “Working Waterfront Uses.” (MacGillis 2006, 8-9).

Outcome—Property Purchase with Novel Easement

The seller agreed in the spring/summer 2003 to a lower sale price of $710,000 for the re-built, 2,390 square foot dock and about 0.15 acres of adjacent land. The financing arrangement was put in place over the summer and fall of 2003. The fishers would contribute $300,000 through a loan from the Farm Credit Bureau. The York Land Trust would supply $410,000 for the conservation easement, raised through a $150,000 loan from the Coastal Enterprises, Inc. (CEI), $185,000 from private donations and $75,000 from philanthropic sources (Libra Foundation, Island Foundation, and the Maine Community Foundation). Fishers accepted a value for the easement that was less than fair market value (MacGillis 2006; Goad 2003).

After a sale price agreement was reached with the seller, the details of the conservation easement between the fishers and the land trust took considerable time and further negotiations. Novel easement language was needed to use land conservation tools to preserve working waterfronts. The land trust executive director noted how no one could “find any examples of where this had been done before in the land trust community” (MacGillis 2006, 7). Nonetheless, with considerable pro bono efforts by the maritime lawyer, technical assistance from the Nature Conservancy and support from many of the champions (e.g., CEI and Harbor Board officials), acceptable conservation easement language was drafted that addressed the parties concerns related to permitted fishing activities, public benefits, water quality, and enforcement (Goad 2003).

Easement language that allowed rather than disallowed activities also presented enforcement challenges, since the York Land Trust, as the easement holder, would be responsible for ensuring compliance with the easement provisions. On-going and industry-specific activities (e.g., boat maintenance procedures, refreshment stand operations, etc.) were more difficult to permit and enforce than clearly defined prohibited activities which are either clearly present or not; further commercial operations needed flexibility and discretion to adjust to market and fishing conditions. The land trust executive director felt the agreed upon working waterfront definition “was a huge breakthrough in our negotiations with the fishermen” (MacGillis 2006, 8).

Water quality was of particular concern to the York Land Trust, since protecting the York River’s water quality was central to their conservation mission. Specific waste management provisions were included in the easement. A bait shop, work shed and concession stand were permitted fishing industry activities under the easement.

Findings

Collaboration

Table 3 contains a side-by-side comparison of the contextual and collaborative process conditions in the FPHP and the Sewall’s Bridge Dock cases. The societal and institutional factors that were important to the success of these cases of collaboration included the high stakes for the parties—i.e., the high number of uninsured fishers and their families, and Sewall’s Bridge Dock as the last dock with truck access in York. Further, a common interest in addressing a clear need existed across parties in spite of their conflicting self-interests—i.e., insurance coverage and preserving waterfront access.

Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) describe critical factors at play in stages of the collaboration process. The “getting started” stage in these case studies shared important characteristics. Both had credible champions serving critical initiating roles to spark and nurture collaboration—i.e., the Archbishop and the York Harbor Board member. These champions also had credibility and access to others who could provide a wide range of needed resources, including expertise, staff, and funding. Further, in both cases, there were multiple stakeholders participating in these early discussions that set the agenda and established a process to be implemented later.

The “implementation” stage of collaboration relates to the design of the process and components of progress. The common implementation factors emerging from both cases included actions to overcome attitudes and perceptions of skeptics. In the case of the health plan, convincing evidence of the scope of the problem and credible lobbying led skeptical politicians to acknowledge that something had to be done. In York, the persuasive power of specific individuals overcame the skepticism of conservation board members. Both cases showed early fund-raising success and feedback that built momentum. Organizational capacity grew as the parties institutionalized their working groups and mobilized expertise, human resources and funding. Finally while conducting the tasks at hand, parties persistently worked through complex, novel plans and demonstrated considerable innovation.
in ideas and strategies. There were additional challenges that the parties had to overcome, such as the lack of mutual understanding between parties (e.g., lobsterers and conservationists). Further challenges included building organizational capacity to keep pace with the speed in which progress was being made and the ever-present need to raise funds.

The final outcome or monitoring stage of collaboration in both cases included the clear achievement of their objectives. The health plan reduced the numbers of uninsured, while the Sewall’s Bridge Dock effort preserved waterfront access for both working lobsterers and preservationists. In both cases there were spin-off benefits beyond the goals of the original collaboration. Both initiatives were advanced as models for other regions; additional community capacity was established through the formation of a fishing industry organization in Massachusetts; and significantly more funds were raised for regional conservation in Maine. Both cases exhibited an enhanced sense of community and pride in achievement.

In sum, the success factors from getting started, through implementation, and to outcomes were similar to those seen in other natural resource management contexts. Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) have identified the critical challenges facing collaboration (e.g., mistrust, perceptions about each other, organizational norms and cultures, novelty of the process and the necessary skills, etc.) and identified success factors that help overcome these challenges (e.g., common ground, early successes, a problem-focus, persistence, commitment, new ideas or approaches, fostering understanding, mobilizing resources, etc.). Weber (2003) identified the role

Table 3. Fishing Partnership Health Plan & Sewall’s Bridge Dock Case Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Fishing Partnership Health Plan</th>
<th>York: Sewall’s Bridge Dock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Getting Started</td>
<td>• High numbers of under- and un-insured among fishing industry.</td>
<td>• Development pressure on waterfront in York.</td>
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<td>• Increased tensions between fishing sectors (gear types, target species).</td>
<td>• Loss of fishing industry and cultural heritage</td>
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<td>• Industry reaches out to the Catholic Archbishop and identifies health care need.</td>
<td>• Opportunity arises to purchase dock.</td>
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<td>• Leadership from Archdiocese Planning Office of Urban Affairs and Caritas Christi.</td>
<td>• Land trusts challenged to help fishermen like they help farmers.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Working group with senior health care consultant, government relations consultant, health insurance advocacy organization, and a Catholic hospital.</td>
<td>• Community leader convenes parties.</td>
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<td>• Caritas Christi funding working group.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Convincing evidence—43% of adults and 34% of children were uninsured.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Process and Progress</td>
<td>• $2M of funding secured from $25M federal boat buy-back program as subsidies for health care premiums.</td>
<td>• Skeptical partners convinced to participate.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Federal and state elected officials allocate additional funds. Total of nearly $5M in federal funds and $30M in state dollars through 2012.</td>
<td>• Advocates for working waterfronts engage parties.</td>
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<td>• Health care administrator hired.</td>
<td>• Partners marshal network of expertise and resources.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Health care consultant builds a plan, through consultation with fishing industry.</td>
<td>• Successfully link conservation and working waterfront interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>• Industry organizational capacity.</td>
<td>• Partners fund-raise $710,000 to purchase property.</td>
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<td>• Uninsured fishermen ranks shrink from 43% in 1997 to 13% in 2006.</td>
<td>• Partners negotiate novel conservation easement language.</td>
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<td>• Lessons for subsidized health care advocates.</td>
<td>• Continuous development pressures maintain incentive to make the partnership work.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Sense of accomplishment and unity among industry.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>• Competing industry sectors and apprehensive fishermen.</td>
<td>• Waterfront access preserved.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Reconciling health care needs and partners’ values (e.g., drugs, reproductive rights).</td>
<td>• Model partnership and template conservation easement.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Novelty for all parties.</td>
<td>• Spin-off initiatives in York and state-wide.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Complexity of health insurance.</td>
<td>• Fund-raising benefits for regional conservation efforts.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Securing adequate funding.</td>
<td>• Community sense of achievement, unity.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Lack of state legislative support in other states and difficulty in exporting the model.</td>
<td>• Bridging the conservation-fishermen divide (i.e., lack of mutual understanding, social class differences, and managing implementation of easement) and reluctant partners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of high stakes, through crises that solidify a common ground, in the context of promoting collaboration. Daniels and Walker’s (2001) comprehensive examination of collaborative learning acknowledges the fundamental lack of understanding between stakeholder groups that must be overcome in collaborative processes. The building of social capital and organizational capacities, which provide greater mobilization of resources have been noted in watershed (Sabatier et al. 2005) and terrestrial natural resource and governance contexts (Koontz et al. 2004). However, one aspect of these cases that is somewhat unique was the rapid speed in which they occurred, from initiation to achievement. For the FPHP, it took 29 months from the first meeting with Boston Archdiocese about health care need to the enrollment of the first fishing family in a plan. In York, the Sewall’s Bridge Dock took 16 months from the first meeting of prospective partners to the purchase closing date. These were remarkably quick collaborative initiatives for the challenges and scope they faced.

Networks in Collaboration

Applications of preliminary network analysis strategies to these case studies shed further light on roles of particular individuals and clarify further research on elements of the internal processes of collaboration. Figure 1 contains a general schematic of the initial communication links made in the FPHP case—i.e., which person first reached out to connect person A to person B. Unlike quantitative network maps, the arrows in Figure 1 do not reflect specific magnitudes and unidirectional flow, but rather general relative role and initiation of the first contact. Figures 1 and 2 were shared with case participants for verification and comment.

In FPHP one individual (CL/IL) displayed a bridging function—i.e., sitting in two distinct communities (fishing and the Catholic Church) simultaneously and assisting in linking the two. The single individual was both a church leader (CL) and industry leader (IL). Initially he wore the two hats independently, but later utilized these connections to initiate the conversation about the fishing industry’s health care needs and the Catholic Church’s expertise in that field. Once he reached out to leaders in the Catholic Church, including the Archbishop (AB), the network expanded to draw in additional and necessary expertise. At the Archbishop’s direction, leaders in the Archdiocese mobilized the Catholic Church’s health care infrastructure (i.e., Caritas Christi (CC), Catholic hospitals (Hos)), the financial resources, and access to its expertise (e.g., lobbyists (Lob), insurance advocacy organizations (Adv), consultants (Con), and administrative executive director-level capacity (ED)).

As the FPHP implementation momentum grew, the network gained further communication and operational capacity and thus, the original bridge no longer needed to serve a bridging role. The leaders of the FPHP and stakeholder groups had fairly close access to the expertise they needed to build a health insurance plan—typically no more than two to three links removed from one another. Once fully operational, the FPHP had an Executive Director (ED) and a smaller role for the Caritas Christi (CC) branch of the network. Thus, while Figure 1 is a graphic representation of initial links between individuals and the resources they needed, as the needs changed over time, so too would the schematic representation of relative relationship between individuals.

In the case of Sewall’s Bridge Dock, an individual also served a critical role linking three independent groups—fishers, conservation organizations, and funders. In this case the convener (Har) in Figure 2 served a liaison role since he did not sit directly in any of the other three stakeholder groups. Bridgers and liaisons are terms that refer to specific roles individuals play in networks (Monge and Contractor 2003). The arrows in Figure 2 do not reflect specific magnitudes of flow through links between nodes, but rather general relative roles and resource flow. The convener/liaison orchestrated many of the original links to build the network of resources and kept the parties working together and moving forward throughout the process of negotiating the property purchase and the conservation easement development. At the same time, he facilitated the links to the expertise needed to initiate and develop the collaboration between fishers and their wives (F, W-P, W-RE), land trusts and conservationists (YLT, MtA2C, TNC), and funders (CDC, Fnds). Once the network gained momentum, the expertise flowed more directly between participants rather than channeled through the liaison—i.e., the schematic at a later point in time would be denser, with arrows from and to multiple individuals.

Further, the network schematic demonstrates that several parties had close contacts with other professional expertise that helped them in the project. For example, both fishermen
(F) were married to wives with specialized and relevant skills and expertise—one wife was a planner (W-P), while the other was a real estate agent (W-RE). The convener/liaison also had a close connection with the conservation organizations through his wife, who served on the board of directors for two conservation organizations (Cons). The spousal links provided trusted sources of relevant information and expertise. In addition, the funders (e.g., CDC) and conservation organizations (e.g., YLT) supplied access to legal advice (Law).

In York, as in FPHP, the parties maintained a relatively compact network without any individual being too many links away from all the necessary expertise and resources needed for the project to succeed. In both cases, the network of expertise mobilized in the collaboration was significant and compact. Further, as one participant in the York case study said, “Everyone’s wearing various hats in Maine,” reflecting the closeness of individuals and resources.

In sum, our understanding of the internal workings of collaboration, and particularly the roles citizens, leaders, and other individuals must play in effective administration of collaborative processes is lacking (Bingham and O’Leary 2006). The research presented here and in particular the use of networks, as a unit of analysis of collaboration cases, is one approach for addressing this gap. Network analysis will permit the assessment of roles and responsibilities, boundaries, communication, and information dissemination within collaboration. The coordination of interdependent relationships across multiple organizations or sectors is more difficult and complicated than the traditional administration of cooperation within an organization or sector (Huxham and Vangen 2005). To overcome these challenges, research has documented the emergence of new roles and leadership. For example, McGuire (2002) considered the capabilities of collaborative network managers, Sagawa and Segal (2000) proposed the need for relationship managers, and Williams (2002) explored boundary spanner roles in collaboration.

While beyond the scope of this research project, past research on network managers and boundary spanners has hypothesized that the bridgers (CL/IL in Figure 1, FPHP) and liaisons (Har in Figure 2, Sewall’s Bridge Dock) are effective at building sustainable relationships, managing through influence and negotiation, managing complexity and interdependencies, and managing roles, accountability and motivations (Williams 2002). Goldsmith and Egger (2004) considered network managers within government and observed that they were often big-picture thinkers, coaches, mediators, negotiators and strategic thinkers. Further, these government network managers had strong interpersonal communication and team building skills.

**Conclusion**

In New England, coastal communities have employed collaborative strategies in social services (e.g., health care) and economic and community development (e.g., working waterfront preservation). The Fishing Partnership Health Plan and the Sewall’s Bridge Dock project showed similar features as other collaborative processes, such as high stakes, common ground among a diverse group of stakeholders, resource mobilization, capacity-building and innovation. Their benefits included concrete outcomes (e.g., reducing ranks of the uninsured fishers, preserving a working dock), as well as valuable secondary benefits (e.g., enhanced unity and sense of community, development models for application elsewhere). Likewise, they faced similar challenges, including funding, competing interests among stakeholders, a lack of mutual understanding, resistance and inertia, and complexity.

From a network perspective, bridgers and liaisons played significant roles in facilitating connections to critical expertise as well as informational and financial resources. Community members who “wear multiple hats” and have communication links with multiple networks of expertise or resources can serve as bridgers or liaisons in a network and appear to be well positioned to be conveners in a collaborative process. The application of preliminary network analysis strategies to collaboration shows promise and warrants further research.

On a concluding and cautionary note, collaborative initiatives often have to overcome distrust, suspicion, reluctance or apprehension among stakeholders. Thus in fisheries, government staff members may be less likely to serve as conveners because of the regulatory role government serves and the distrust and suspicion inherent in the fisheries regulatory role (Hartley and Robertson 2006). Further, community-based initiatives, including collaboration among multiple partners.
that depend heavily on highly networked community leaders that “wear multiple hats” in their community, may have difficulty being inclusive of the less empowered in a community and thus may be particularly vulnerable to the equity and inclusiveness challenges.

**Endnotes**

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2. www.resilientcommunities.ca
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